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Existence Versus Primacy: A Critical Overview of Phenomenal Intentionality

Michael Galang & Can Mekik

Phenomenal intentionality challenges the dominant approach to intentionality in the analytic tradition. There are two theses that characterize phenomenal intentionality: that it exists, and that traditional theories of intentionality are not equipped to account for it; that is to say, that it is somehow basic.¹ We argue that the existence of phenomenal intentionality is plausible, but that the second thesis is suspect. Phenomenal intentionality presupposes that both phenomenology and intentionality are real psychological phenomena, and its defenders present it as a competitor with other realist approaches to the above. We therefore discuss both intentionality and phenomenality as realists would. Our discussion is in three major parts. We first make some general remarks about intentionality; we then discuss what Horgan and Tienson (2002) call separatism and their denial of it; and, finally, we put forward our argument for the thesis stated above.

I. A Brief Overview of Intentionality

The classical paradigms for intentionality are all rooted in the analysis of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and the like. If there is one theoretical feature that the classical paradigms share, it is that their point of departure is the construal of intentionality as a feature that warrants or enables a special kind of relation.

One theoretical tradition (Brentano, Twardowski, Meinong and followers) holds that every intentional state has an object (Sajama and

¹ By traditional "theories of intentionality," we mean the theories discussed in Fodor (1994). Also see "The Primacy Thesis" below.

Kampinen, 1987). This claim is at the heart of the most famous puzzle of intentionality: there are intentional states whose objects appear not to exist (e.g. there is no round square, yet we can entertain the thought that the round square is round), but if intentionality is a relation then this cannot be so—for a relation to hold, its *relata* must exist. One must either give up the notion that intentionality involves a relation (for a time, Brentano thought intentionality was quasi-relational—meaning, roughly, that it involved not a relation, but something relation-like), make sense of the oxymoron that is the claim that there are non-existent objects, or give up the notion that intentionality is a relation that necessarily involves intentional objects (though, without giving up the notion that intentionality does involve a special kind of relation). If one opts for either of the two initial options, one endorses *the object theory of intentionality* (Sajama and Kampinen, 1987).

The analytic tradition has, following Frege and Russell, opted to go with the third option: intentionality involves a subject being in some relation to a content, and not an object. Contents can roughly be thought of as descriptions of states-of-affairs. This theory is called *the content theory of intentionality* (Sajama and Kampinen, 1987). We thus start our discussion with the following picture: intentionality is that which warrants content attributions, where contents are construed as accuracy or satisfaction conditions (Seager and Bourget, 2007). This view is quite flexible and is tacitly or explicitly endorsed by multiple authors of interest (in particular, Horgan, 2013 and Horgan and Tienson, 2002). However, we shall see that phenomenal intentionality blurs the neat distinction between object and content theories of intentionality. There are two general questions that arise in connection to content attributions: (i) what contents can properly be attributed and (ii) when, and what things can properly be the subjects of content attributions. A central concept to the latter question was brought to the fore by Scarle (1980): the notion of intrinsic, or original, intentionality, which we discuss below (see 'Horgan's Morph Sequence Argument').

II. Towards Phenomenal Intentionality: Phenomenology and Intentionality Together

Phenomenology is a part of experience. The phenomenology of an experience is the way the experience appears to its experiencer. It is the first-person, introspectible aspect of an experience of which its experiencer is aware. An experience is an event with a patient—its experiencer—and always² has a phenomenology. An experiencer's phenomenology is not identical to or completely accounted for by some or all of the experiencer's capacity to differentially respond to stimuli; one can seemingly have a discriminative capacity while apparently lacking corresponding phenomenology—there apparently needs to be something more (Siewert, 2000).

It was common for analytic philosophers to hold that phenomenality and intentionality could be understood independently (Seager and Bourget, 2007; Pitt, 2004; Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Lycan, 2008), a view that Horgan and Tienson (2002) call separatism. This trend seems to have been losing ground for the past twenty years. Phenomenal intentionality is a decidedly anti-separatist thesis, but it is not the only one; there are multiple extant alternatives (see Seager and Bourget, 2007).

There are multiple ways to deny separatism. One way to do this is to claim that phenomenology is intentional, whether in part or in its entirety. Another approach is to claim that some paradigmatically intentional phenomena are also phenomenal. Of these two alternatives, the first is more popular and arguably less controversial. Phenomenal intentionality itself is a remarkably strong anti-separatist notion. It draws on and enhances both of the claims above. This is why Horgan and Tienson (2002) discuss both “the intentionality of phenomenology” and “the phenomenology of intentionality” prior to their defense of phenomenal intentionality. We follow the same pattern.

II.i Phenomenology Viewed as an Intentional Phenomenon.

Proponents of phenomenal intentionality approach the intentionality of phenomenology from a first-person perspective: they point to a kind of intentionality inherent in our experiences. For instance, Horgan and Tienson (2002) point out that whenever we have a phenomenal

² Or sometimes. It depends on your inclinations. See, for example, Byrne (2004).

experience, it is always *about* something (i.e. objects whose properties we experience as a unity and through time), and that without this aboutness there would not be any phenomenal experience to talk about. Intentionality is therefore inseparable from the experience's phenomenal character. They also point out that the intentionality of phenomenology has often been missed. When philosophers talk about phenomenal experiences it is often in the form of a scenario wherein the object of the experience is ignored in service of highlighting the subjective aspect of the experience in question. As such, it comes as no surprise that the intentionality of phenomenology is missed. However, even if it were the case that we were only talking about the "pure" experience, the intentional content inherent in phenomenology would still be there. As Horgan and Tienson put it:

For any experience involving a specific shade of red, one can abstract away from the total experience and focus on the distinctive what-its-like of that shade of red per se—a phenomenal aspect of this total experience that it has in common with innumerable other total experiences that differ in the perceived location of the experienced red or in the shape of the red surface, etc. *But even considered in isolation from any total visual-experiential state, the what-it's-like of experiencing red is already intentional, because it involves red as the intentional object of one's experience.* Again, redness is not experienced as an introspectible property of one's own experiential state, but rather as a property of visually presented objects. (pg. 521; emphasis added).

II.ii Intentionality Viewed as a Phenomenal Phenomenon

Traditionally, thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and the like—the attitudes—are thought not to have an accompanying phenomenology. Phenomenal intentionality is associated with an unorthodox notion concerning this matter—cognitive phenomenology. In a review of the topic, Lycan (2008) traces the thesis back to Goldman (1993), though

Kriegel (2013) claims arguments in its favor go, at least in form, as far back as Chisholm (1957). According to Horgan and Tienson:

Intentional states have a character, and this phenomenal character is precisely the what-it-is-like of experiencing a specific propositional-attitude type vis-a-vis a specific intentional content. Change either the attitude-type (believing, desiring, wondering, hoping, etc.) or the particular intentional content, and the phenomenal character thereby changes too. Eliminate the intentional state, and the phenomenal character is thereby eliminated too. This particular phenomenal character could not be present in experience in the absence of that intentional state itself. (pg. 522)

Having a particular conscious belief about a rose (e.g. that you enjoy looking at it) inherently comes with the phenomenal experience of the particular intentional content. In addition, there is also something that it is like to have a belief about the rose in the first place. David Pitt (2004) defends a similar view:

Each type of conscious thought—each state of consciously thinking that p , for all thinkable contents p —has a proprietary, distinctive, individuating phenomenology. (pg. 5)

To give us a glimpse at what this phenomenology is, Pitt asks us to consider the following syntactically challenging sentence:

(1) The boy the man the girl saw chased fled.

Pay attention to what your reading of (1) is like for you, and call it ϕ . Pitt tells us that (1) means the same thing as:

(1') The boy, who was chased by the man that the girl saw, fled.

Now, return to (1), and again pay attention to what your reading is like for you, call it ψ . Pitt claims there is a phenomenal difference between φ and ψ , and further that the only difference can be your lack of the proprietary, distinctive and individuating phenomenology that (1) in φ .

According to Pitt, when you have a conscious thought that (1), not only are you related to some content—namely the proposition that (1)—but you also have some unique corresponding cognitive phenomenology—a proprietary, distinctive, individuating phenomenology that (1). Apart from phenomenological demonstrations of the sort above, Pitt offers the following argument:

Normally [...] one is able consciously, introspectively, and non-inferentially (henceforth "Immediately") to do three distinct (but closely related) things: (a) to distinguish one's occurrent conscious thoughts from one's other occurrent conscious mental states; (b) to distinguish one's occurrent conscious thoughts each from the others and (c) to identify each one of one's occurrent conscious thoughts as the thought it is (i.e., as having the *content* it does). But [...], one would not be able to do these things unless each (type of) occurrent conscious thought had a phenomenology that is (1) different from that of any other type of conscious mental state (proprietary), (2) different from that of any other type of conscious thought (distinct), and (3) constitutive of its (representational) content (individuating). (pg. 7; emphasis in original)

By 'representational content,' Pitt is referring to "those properties in virtue of which [a thought] represents (expresses) the proposition it does" (pg. 6). This allows Pitt to remain neutral with regards to any specific content theory of intentionality.

III. Phenomenal Intentionality

In addition to the intentionality of phenomenal experience and the

phenomenality of intentional attitudes and contents, Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue for a kind of intentionality that is entirely phenomenal—Phenomenal Intentionality (henceforth PI). We break PI up into two broad theses: the existence thesis and the primacy thesis. PI has been analyzed into various other theses (see Kriegel, 2013), but we think that, in the interest of generality and parsimony, this is the best way to look at it (Mendelovici & Bourget, 2014, provide a similar analysis). Almost every proponent of PI endorses that it exists (existence thesis) *and* that there is something special about it, something that renders the contemporary paradigm unable to account for PI (primacy thesis).

III.i The Existence Thesis

Horgan and Tienson argue for the existence of PI via their *Phenomenal Duplicates* thought experiment. Consider a being whose phenomenology is identical to yours. Other than its phenomenology, we do not know anything else about this being (its environment, physiology etc.). For all we know this being could be some sort of Cartesian ghost or a brain in a vat. The point is that, by creating this 'veil of ignorance', the thought experiment can filter out all of the factors other than the phenomenology (external factors, especially).

Now recall that phenomenal experiences (e.g. color-experiences) have intentional content that is inseparable from their phenomenal character. If this is right, then it follows that your phenomenal duplicate will be presented a world in exactly the same way as it is to you. Now imagine looking at a picture hanging crooked on a wall. Your phenomenal duplicate will have the same experience with the same phenomenal content—the same rich set of phenomenal characters that make up the phenomenal experience of looking at some picture hanging crooked on a wall. Whether or not your phenomenal duplicate's experience is veridical depends on the environment it is in, for example, whether there actually is a crooked picture, or whether your duplicate is a brain in a vat. However, Horgan and Tienson (2002) contend that it is the phenomenal content which you and your duplicate have which determines the accuracy conditions of the phenomenal experience that you are both having independently of the environment. These accuracy conditions are provided by a special kind of content, namely,

phenomenal intentional content. That is not to say that your experience has no dependency on the environment, but only that the accuracy conditions of your phenomenal intentional content depend only on the contents of your experience. We can vary the environment all we want; so long as the phenomenology remains constant, the phenomenal intentional content will also remain constant.

It is not quite clear whether or not phenomenal content can stay constant while the environment is varied—phenomenal externalists argue that it cannot. As such, one could dismiss PI on the grounds that the thought experiment does not work on principle. However, it is not clear from Horgan and Tienson's (2002) use of the term 'content' that they are using it in the orthodox sense. If anything, the phenomenal duplicates thought experiment points toward an interpretation of *phenomenal intentional content* as being a kind of phenomenally accessible feature. Let us call this interpretation the *phenomenal feature* interpretation.

One might object that the phenomenal feature interpretation is explicitly denied by Horgan and Tienson (2002) when they say that “the sensory-phenomenal experience, by itself, determines conditions of accuracy: i.e., a class of ways the environment must be in order for the experience to be accurate”. However, the main motivation for the phenomenal feature interpretation comes from the quotation in Section 2.1, where Horgan and Tienson (2002) actually seem to endorse it: “the what-it’s-like of experiencing red is already intentional, because it involves red as the intentional object of one’s experience” (pg. 521). Further, as noted above, several passages in the text suggest that the accuracy conditions determined by phenomenal intentional content are ‘phenomenologically determined’ and emphasize the fact that these conditions are not sensitive to the environment for their individuation. This is strange, as Horgan and Tienson (2002) also do not deny externalism. Instead, they distinguish *narrow* and *wide truth conditions*, a move that leaves us with serious doubts as to whether the two are the same kind of thing.

Now, we have outlined two broad ways of interpreting “phenomenal intentional content”. By the first, phenomenal intentional content is a kind of content in the ordinary sense of the term. By the

second, phenomenal intentional content is a kind of phenomenal property. If we adopt the first interpretation, the proponent of PI has to argue for the narrowness of phenomenal content—something we do not endorse. However, we do not have any immediate grievances with the second interpretation. As such, if the second interpretation is right, then we believe that the existence of PI is, at the very least, plausible.

III.ii The Primacy Thesis

The primacy thesis takes things to another level; not only does PI exist, but traditional theories of intentionality are apparently unable to account for it. It will be useful to characterize which theories of intentionality proponents of PI find inadequate—to characterize just which theories these “traditional” theories are. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a clear criterion picking out these theories. We can still, however, carve out the space approximately.

Uriah Kriegel (2013) identifies these theories as those which subscribe to what he calls the Naturalist-Externalist Research Program. In this program, intentionality is typically “construed as involving in its core a type of tracking relation, whereby internal states occur sensitively to the presence of specific external conditions” (pg. 1). Causal, covariational, teleosemantic and learning-based theories of intentionality all fall under the purview of this characterization (Horgan and Tienson, 2002).³ Externalist theories of intentionality also seem to be targeted, if only because they tend to be of one of the types above. Some arguments for primacy directly target externalism, as we shall see. In this section, we consider and reject two main arguments for the primacy thesis, the argument from the narrowness of phenomenology and Horgan's (2013) Morph Sequence Argument.

III.iii The Argument from Narrowness.

One way to show that PI cannot be accounted for by other theories of intentionality is to show that phenomenology is narrow. For the purposes of this discussion, a property is narrow if and only if it supervenes only on the local properties of the thing that instantiates it (Tye, 2007)—micro-physical duplicates share their narrow physical properties and

³ Such theories would be the topic of Stich and Warfield (1994).

differ in their wide properties, or so the story goes. In other words, phenomenology is narrow if and only if internal properties (of the brain in our case) wholly constitute it. If phenomenology is narrow, then it follows that PI is also narrow. After all, if there is a kind of intentional content that is completely determined by phenomenology, and phenomenology is narrow, then it follows that there is a kind of intentional content that is completely narrow.

To motivate their claim to the narrowness of phenomenology, Horgan and Tienson (2002) make a distinction between *causal* and *constitutive* roles in regards to phenomenology. They do not deny that the environment *causes* one to have certain phenomenological experiences; however, that does not thereby mean that the environment partly *constitutes* one's phenomenology. Furthermore, regardless of the fact that environmental stimuli cause phenomenal experiences, the connection is not direct. The stimuli must first be picked up by peripheral sensory processes (eyes, skin, etc.), then transferred to the brain via neural pathways, then processed in the appropriate way by the brain, and then, finally, the phenomenology emerges.

Horgan and Tienson's (2002) claim can be viewed as placing a limit on the physical states upon which phenomenal states can supervene. They say that so long as one's sensory receptors exhibit certain patterns of activation, we can, given some other knowledge about one's brain, tell which phenomenal states one will be in regardless of the factors causing the patterns of activation. In that sense, the environment can be said to be causing one's phenomenology, though it plays no constitutive role in it. Intuitive as this picture of phenomenology may be, it is a controversial one. Phenomenal externalists deny this picture with a variety of thought experiments that exhibit brain structures that are radically decoupled from the environment (Tye, 2007).

However, Horgan and Tienson (2002) do not so much establish the narrowness of phenomenology as they advertise its consequences for PI. Thus, if one is a non-believer about the narrowness of phenomenology, one will also remain unconvinced by the argument from narrowness for the primacy of PI. We are not convinced that phenomenology is narrow. As such, as long as Horgan and Tienson do not

meet externalist objections to the narrowness of phenomenology, there will be no way forward for this line of argument.

III.iv Horgan's Morph Sequence Argument

In contrast to the argument from narrowness, Horgan (2013) provides a direct argument for the primacy of PI. He calls it the Morph Sequence Argument (henceforth MSA). The MSA is based on Searle's (1980) Chinese Room thought experiment. Briefly, imagine a guy who is a non-Chinese speaker and is tasked with responding to queries, all in writing, in an isolated room. The queries and responses are sequences of Chinese characters. The guy is never given any information about the meanings of the queries or responses, he is just given very detailed procedural instructions for matching queries to responses in another language he understands. However, it turns out that the queries are actually well-formed Chinese utterances, and the responses are well-formed felicitous Chinese language responses to those utterances. Searle's contention is that, despite the responses' being intelligible to those outside the room, the guy "understands no Chinese" and therefore has no Chinese language intentionality.

Searle's point is that functionalist accounts of intentionality are insufficient in explaining original intentionality (henceforth OI); that is to say, the intentionality that some mental states, such as beliefs, desires and so on, have intrinsically.⁴ Horgan tries to harness the intuitions mobilized by the Chinese Room in the MSA to drive home his point—the primacy of PI. The MSA, as the name suggests, follows a series of scenarios which teases our intuitions, little by little, to lead to the conclusion that what is missing in the Chinese Room is PI; or in other

⁴ Some things, such as this text, are intentional—they afford warranted content attributions—but only, the claim goes, insofar as they are artifacts which warrant interpretations. But an interpretation is an intentional state: there must be an interpreter to whom the interpretation can be attributed. Thus, such artifacts have intentionality in virtue of more basic sorts of intentionality. Searle, and many others, believe that this chain of interdependence bottoms out in certain distinctive states which are intentional in and of themselves. Such states are intrinsically, or originally, intentional and creatures that have them have intrinsic, or original intentionality.

words, PI is OI.

The first scenario is the Chinese Room in its original form. Horgan argues that we all agree that the guy understands no Chinese.

The second scenario provides the guy with a compact symbol manipulator appended to his brain; Horgan calls this the “monitoring/processing/stimulation” (MPS) device. The MPS device does exactly what the guy did in the room. The difference is that it is faster and automatic. Essentially, the MPS device monitors the guy's visual input as he reads the symbols. It then manipulates the symbols based on the same procedural instructions as in the first scenario, after which it sends various neural signals to the guy's brain such that he spontaneously writes down certain symbols on a piece of paper. Horgan argues that we all agree that the guy still understands no Chinese.

The third scenario generalizes the MPS's function to a new modality: speech. As with the guy's visual input, the MPS device now tracks the guy's auditory input. The MPS device has the ability to recognize Chinese speech sounds and map them onto the various symbols that characterize them in written language. As such, the MPS device can manipulate auditory input in the same fashion as visual input. It also sends various other neural signals to the guy's brain which cause him to spontaneously make meaningless-to-him vocal noises. Unbeknownst to him, those vocal noises are actually spoken Chinese. Horgan argues that we all still agree that the guy understands no Chinese.

The fourth scenario gives the guy a telescope with which to see the people outside the room. He can see the people talking to him, talking to each other, and writing down symbols on pieces of paper. Unfortunately, he has a strange case of anterograde amnesia which prevents him from remembering anything after thirty seconds. This prevents him from learning Chinese via behaviors, lip movements, etc. that he is now observing. The MPS is still attached and keeps its updated function from the third scenario. Horgan argues that we all still agree that the guy understands no Chinese.

The fifth scenario gives the MPS a few upgrades. First, the MPS's monitoring and actuating abilities are generalized to include all of the guy's senses, to reflect his mental states and to produce correct body

language. The second upgrade gives the MPS the power to generate in the guy (non-cognitive) sensory images, emotions, and any other non-cognitive phenomenology that normally arises in a normal Chinese speaker. The third upgrade makes it such that the MPS device prevents the guy from having the sort of mental state one would normally have, given the situation he is in (e.g. confusion, fear, etc.). Additionally, the guy now interacts with the Chinese population outside the room. He converses, laughs, shakes hands etc. with them in such a way that an ordinary Chinese speaking person would not be able to tell him apart from any other Chinese speaking person. Horgan argues that we all still agree that the guy understands no Chinese.

The thrust of the argument is that, without the right kind of phenomenology, one cannot have the intentional content associated with that kind of phenomenology. In the guy's case, he does not have the intentional content associated with the Chinese language utterances he emits because he has no Chinese language understanding phenomenology. A puzzling question is what exactly this Chinese language phenomenology is supposed to be like. We think that this phenomenology should allow one to immediately (in Pitt's sense) (i) distinguish any utterance of Chinese from any other utterance of Chinese, (ii) distinguish any utterance of Chinese from any other utterance (in any other language) that has the same sense and (iii) to identify any utterance as having the sense that it does. We will not discuss whether or not such phenomenology exists at all; however, without a conception of Chinese language understanding phenomenology similar to the one above, the argument will not get off the ground. In other words, the MSA shows, in the best case, that PI is necessary for intentionality. If PI were OI, it would be sufficient for intentionality; but this, the MSA does not show.

One can reply that the MSA coupled with the argument from narrowness is sufficient to show that PI is OI, but this still does not work. To see this, one can look at the MSA as the second half of a double dissociation experiment between PI and intentionality as construed traditionally. A double dissociation is a common experimental design used to demonstrate that two or more factors are independent of one another. Consider Broca's and Wernicke's areas in the brain. Roughly,

Broca's area functions as the language comprehension area, while Wernicke's area functions as the language production area.⁵ We know this because people with lesions in their Broca's area lack the ability to produce fluent speech while retaining the ability to understand speech, while people with lesions in their Wernicke's area have been shown to produce fluent but nonsensical speech (Van Orden, Pennington & Stone, 2001).

The first half of the experiment is just the narrowness of PI: one can have phenomenal intentional content without in any way being in the right kind of relationship to the world, thus not having the associated content (in the traditional sense). The MSA shows that one can be in the right kinds of external relationship to the world to count as having some content (in the traditional sense) without having the associated phenomenal intentional content. Thus, the two are independent. But, there is still a missing premise, namely, the premise that is supposed to show how PI is more basic than intentionality as construed traditionally. Horgan seems to believe that, because PI is what is needed for language understanding to occur, and that OI is what was missing in Searle's original argument, it follows that PI is OI. However, this is only one possibility. If the scenario was inverted, and PI was there but intentionality as construed traditionally was always missing, would it follow that the guy understands Chinese? We think not. It could easily be the case that both PI and intentionality as construed traditionally are required for OI—that each is necessary but neither is sufficient on their own.

IV. Conclusion

It is not clear whether the primacy of PI is tenable, as it depends on one's commitments with regards to internalism. Furthermore, the idea that PI should be OI seems to be intuitive, but also not very clearly supported. To show that something is OI, one must show that having it is sufficient for having intentionality, but it is not clear how anyone would go about

doing this. In any case, Horgan and Tienson (2002) as well as Horgan (2013) do not do this. While we focused on the works of Horgan and Tienson, any defender of PI faces the same challenges in so far as they subscribe to both the existence and primacy theses.

However, we should note that what we find genuinely novel about PI is the phenomenal feature interpretation, for it seems to define an approach to intentionality that is genuinely different from the traditional paradigm. But, we should also add the caveat that it does not necessarily contradict the traditional paradigm. The phenomenal feature interpretation seems able to capture the spirit of the object theory without the drawbacks.

⁵ In case it was not clear, this is a *very* simplistic characterization of Broca's and Wernicke's area.

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The Telltale Footprint: Doctored Evidence and Epistemic Value

Ryan Martins

In his paper “Getting Told and Being Believed,” Richard Moran argues for what he calls the Assurance View of Testimony. In order to do so, he first attempts to clear the ground from a prominent family of views which take testimony as evidence. The main thrust of his critique is that these evidential views of testimony seem to be analogous to cases of doctored forensic evidence. He challenges the evidentialist to show how testimony’s deliberate presentation could in any way add, rather than detract from, the testimony’s evidential worth, as we take it to do with other forms of evidence.

In order to put Moran’s objection in context, it is important to note a few relatively major considerations that are affected by the success or failure of his objection. Remember that Moran ultimately seeks to put forward his own view, the Assurance View, which moves away from evidence, and instead focuses on the exchange between a speaker and a hearer, and the assurance that one receives from the other. In order to do this, he first purports to expose a flaw in the competing evidentialist picture by way of his unfavorable analogy. The first thing to notice becomes evident once one considers the role testimony plays in knowledge. Testimony, along with sense perception, is one of the most pervasive sources of our knowledge. If Moran is correct in his assessment of the evidential view, then it seems like testimony functions as an epistemically irresponsible source of knowledge – a clearly undesirable result. Second, if Moran is right and his analogy holds, then the evidentialist’s picture is critically flawed – it is committed to conceiving of all testimonial evidence as doctored. Since his own view forgoes the evidential model in favour of one that highlights the relationship between the speaker and hearer, Moran has a strong reason to accept the Assurance View over existing evidential accounts. If,